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Abstrat
The problem of insider trading and other illegal praties in nanial markets is an
important issue in the eld of nanial regulatory poliies. Market ontrol bodies,
suh as the US SEC or the Italian CONSOB [1℄, regularly perform statistial analyses
on seurity pries in order to unveil lues of fraudulent behaviour within the market.
Fraudulent behaviour is onneted to the more general problem of information asym-
metries, whih had already been addressed in the eld of experimental eonomis
(see, for instane, refs. [2,3,4℄). Reently, interesting onlusions were drawn thanks
to a omputer-simulated market where agents had dierent piees of information
about the future dividend ash ow of exhanged seurities [5℄. Here, by means of
an agent-based artiial market: the Genoa Artiial Stok Market (GASM) [6,7℄,
the more spei problem of fraudulent behaviour in a nanial market is studied.
A simplied model of fraudulent behaviour is implemented and the ation of fraud-
ulent agents on the statistial properties of simulated pries and the agent wealth
distribution is investigated.
1 Introdution
Laws and regulations dene fraudulent behaviour in a nanial market. Among
the many possible instanes of fraud, we will fous our attention on insider
trading [1,8℄. It must be stressed that the enforement of insider trading laws
took plae mainly in the 1990s, as a onsequene of advanes in the eonomi
theory as well as in the empirial analysis of nanial markets. Atually, many
papers have been devoted to insider trading: a reent review by Bainbridge,
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quoted by Bhattaharia and Daouk, lists 261 papers [8℄. In the past, vari-
ous arguments were presented against the introdution and enforement of
insider trading laws. For instane, it has been pointed out that exploiting in-
sider information is the only way to ompensate managers. It has been also
argued that the insider pushes the stok prie faster towards a value, whih
better reets the fundamental value of the ompany. Although the problem
of evaluating the soial and eonomial eets of insider trading an only be
assessed by means of aurate empirial studies, there are several diulties
to be overome, mainly due to the fat that several piees of information on
insider trading are ondential. However, after an empirial analysis of stok
markets in 103 ountries, Bhattaharya and Daouk were able to onlude that
enforement of insider trading laws redues the ost of equity by about 5%
[8℄.
In European ountries where insider-trading laws are enfored, the sope of
the law inludes any seurity listed on a stok exhange, but also fae-to-fae
transations may be taken into aount. The inside information is dened as
non-publi and prie sensitive. Among the enfored subjets there are institu-
tional insiders, other primary insiders and tippees. Some forbidden behaviours
are: trading on own aount, trading on behalf of third parties and ommuni-
ating the information to third parties. There may be penal, ivil and admin-
istrative santions, inluding imprisonment and nes. Fines are omputed in
relation to the disgorgement: the eonomi value of the insider information.
There are several methods to ompute the disgorgement. The US Seurity
Exhange Commission uses a proedure, whih is based on the Event Study
Analysis in order to evaluate the return perentage variation aused by the in-
sider information. This is alled potential eonometri disgorgement. To avoid
some pitfalls of the US method, the Italian body (CONSOB) has developed a
new probabilisti approah, whih will be disussed below.
Insider trading is an instane of information asymmetry in a nanial market,
whih was disussed at length in the literature [2,3,9,10,11,12℄. Reently, it has
been addressed by means of an artiial market [4℄. With artiial markets,
it is possible to study the eet of information asymmetries in a well-dened
and ontrolled environment.
In this paper, we present a simplied model of insider trading in the Genoa
Artiial Stok Market (GASM). The paper is organised as follows. Setion
2 is devoted to the methodology of probabilisti disgorgement and to larify
the proedure used here to ompute disgorgement in the artiial market. In
setion 3, the results of the GASM simulations are presented and disussed.
Finally, in setion 4, the reader an nd the main onlusions and the diretion
for future work on insider trading in artiial nanial markets.
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2 An alternative path to probabilisti disgorgement
As mentioned in the Introdution, the Italian market regulation authority
(CONSOB) has reently developed a new approah to unveil the eonomi
value of the information exploited by eah insider. CONSOB has alled this
proedure potential probabilisti disgorgement [1℄. The (simplied) proedure
onsists of the following steps.
At rst, two time-horizons are dened, α and Θ. The former orresponds to
the period in whih the insider will build his/her position on the stok; the
latter is dened by the day in whih the insider information is published and
the rst, the seond or the n-th day after. The number of days onsidered
is related to the liquidity of the stok under investigation and, in a standard
insider-trading sheme, it oinides with the instant in whih the insider loses
his/her position.
The seond step rests on two hypotheses. The rst one is that the insider
annot ontrol the prie dynamis before the ourrene of the event and
the seond one is that he/she will reate a long (short) position, if the event
information will indue an inrease (derease) of the stok prie. In other
words, the insider predits that the preferential information will move the
market more in the period Θ than it moved in the period α. Therefore, the
parameters of a geometri Brownian motion representing the time evolution
of the stok in the period α are estimated, by using daily data.
Finally, on this basis, an osillation band for the prie of the stok under
study in the time-period is dened by xing a signiane level. The dierene
between the atual stok prie after the insider information is revealed and
this band represents the disgorgement.
A slight but important modiation in omputing the potential probabilisti
disgorgement would be replaing the geometri Brownian motion with a pro-
ess that better represents the leptokurti behaviour of the return probability
density estimate. To this purpose, there are various possible hoies. An in-
teresting possibility would be using trunated Lévy walks à la Koponen [13℄
or their generalisation proposed by Boyarhenko and Levendorskii [14℄. Here,
however, as we use an artiial market, we an diretly simulate the behaviour
of the same market, with and without the ation of the insider. Therefore, in
the next setion, we shall diretly evaluate the impat of insider-trading a-
tivities.
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3 GASM model for insider trading
3.1 Brief desription of the artiial market
We modelled the behavior of an insider trader in the framework of the Genoa
Artiial Stok Market (GASM). In the market, N = 10, 000 random traders
buy and sell a risky asset in exhange of ash. The deision-making proess
of eah random trader is onstrained by the limited nanial resoures and
inuened by the volatility of the market. The resulting prie proess is hara-
terized by reversion to the mean and exhibits fat-tailed distributions of returns
and volatility lustering [15℄. The average prie (equilibrium prie) is given by
the ratio of the total amount of ash present in the system and the number
of shares of the traded stok. In a losed market, i.e. no ash or shares inow
or outow in the system, the long-run prie average is onstant. An inrease
of the global amount of ash in the system auses an equal inrease of the
long-run mean value.
3.2 A model of insider trading
The prie proess exhibits a mean-reverting behavior around the equilibrium
prie; thus a fundamentalist trading strategy with fundamental prie equal to
the equilibrium prie would be protable [16℄. As prie sensitive event, the
injetion of liquidity in the market has been hosen, simulating the ation of
a entral bank. Being the equilibrium prie equal to the ratio between the
total amount of ash and share number, liquidity injetion yields a new higher
equilibrium prie. A fundamentalist agent, who knows in advane the date of
this event, should be able to take prot of this piee of insider information.
We onsider a number of dierent simulations with the following features:
• N random traders and 1 insider fundamentalist trader operate in the mar-
ket; at eah time step, eah random trader issues orders with probability
q;
• at the beginning of the simulation (t = 0), eah random trader reeives the
same amount of liquidity c(0) and number of shares a(0), while the insider
is given liquidity cˆ(0) and zero number of shares aˆ(0);
• the initial value of the stok prie is set at the equilibrium prie:
p¯ = (Nc(0) + cˆ(0))/Na(0) (1)
in order to quikly reah the equilibrium state haraterized by utuations
around the equilibrium prie;
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• bakground trading is realized by the ation of random traders, who issue
random buy and sell orders with no information on the timing and magni-
tude of liquidity injetion;
• at a given time t∗ the global amount of ash is inreased by 10% and the new
ash is distributed to agents proportionally to the fration of the total wealth
(ash+number of shares) they own. Thus the equilibrium prie inreases by
10%:
p¯(t ≥ t∗) = (1.0 + 0.1) · p¯.
Indeed, for t < t∗, the equilibrium prie is given by eq. (1);
• the insider knows the timing and magnitude of the injetion of liquidity in
advane; let τ denote this advane;
• the insider is inative for t < t∗−τ and ats as a fundamentalist trader with
the new appropriate fundamental value, p¯(t ≥ t∗), for t∗ − τ ≤ t < t∗. This
means that in this time period, the insider tries to onvert all the ash into
stoks. For t ≥ t∗, the insider issues sell orders if the stok prie is greater
than the fundamental value p¯(t ≥ t∗), otherwise he/she keeps its position.
As a nal remark, the period α disussed in Setion 2 orresponds to t∗− τ ≤
t < t∗ when the insider builds his/her position, whereas, the periods Θ in
whih he/she leaves the market orresponds to t ≥ t∗.
4 Simulations
As already mentioned, the number of random traders operating in the simu-
lations is 10,000. The probability of ativation is q = 0.02. The initial amount
of liquidity is c(0) = 100, 000 units, whereas the initial share number of the
risky stok is a(0) = 1, 000. As for the insider, his/her ativity is haraterized
by two parameters: initial liquidity, cˆ(0), and advane, τ . The hosen values
for cˆ(0) are:
cˆ(0) = 2k · c(0), k = −1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4.
The hosen values for the advane τ are: 20, 40, 60, 80, 100 time steps. For
eah value of τ and cˆ(0), 25 independent realizations have been simulated, for
a total of 750 simulations. Eah simulation lasts 2,000 time steps, whih in
the framework of GASM an be onsidered as trading days. The insider event
ours at t∗ = 200 days.
In Figure 1, results of a typial simulation are shown. In this partiular ase,
cˆ(0) = c(0) and τ = 20 days. The left-upper plot displays the prie variation
as a funtion of time. The eet of the liquidity injetion at time t∗ = 200
days is evident: after the injetion, the average prie inreases towards 110
units and then utuates around this value. The right-upper plot shows the
insider ash as a funtion of time. Essentially, the insider starts with 100,000
5
units of ash and ends with nearly 120,000 units, with a return of about 20 %.
In a few days after day t∗ − τ = 180, the insider onverts all his/her ash into
shares. At day t∗ = 200, he/she reeives the additional amount of ash like
all the random traders. Finally, when the prie beomes greater than the new
fundamental value (110 units), he/she starts issuing sell orders and sueeds
in getting rid of the shares in a few days. The behavior of the insider an
be appreiated also in the two bottom plots, where his/her number of shares
(left) and his/her total wealth (right) are presented.
In order to ompare the gain of the insider with the average performane of
random traders, Figures 2, 3 and 4 present the random-trader perentage in-
rease in aggregate ash, apitalization and wealth, respetively, as a funtion
of insider ash and advane. The perentage inrease is omputed between
day 2,000 (the end of the simulation) and day t∗ − τ − 1 (the day before the
insider entering into the market). The error-bar half-width orresponds to two
standard errors.
In Figure 2, random-trader aggregate ash return is ompared with the gain of
the insider. In Figure 3, the insider gain is ompared with the aggregate wealth
return of random traders. No denite trend appears as a funtion of insider
advane, but the insider average gain systematially dereases with inreasing
initial ash. The reason is that the insider inuenes more and more the stok
prie when his/her initial ash grows. In fat, he/she tries to onvert his/her
ash into shares as soon as possible, and issues buy orders that are larger the
riher he/she is. Large buy orders an imply a prie inrease. If the stok prie
is higher, the number of shares he/she an buy for a given amount of ash is
lower. In other words, if he/she inuenes the stok prie, letting it inrease,
it beomes no longer true that with a double amount of ash, he/she is able to
buy a double amount of shares. The derease in average ash return of random
traders is due to the mehanism of ash distribution within the insider event.
When the wealth of the insider is large enough, random traders reeive less
new ash in aggregate (see Se. 3.2). In Figure 4, the market apitalization
return is shown between day 2,000 and day t∗−τ−1. No systemati eet due
to insider ativity appears. For this reason, also the aggregate wealth return
of random traders in Figure 3 does not show any systemati dependene on
insider parameters.
5 Disussion and onlusion
In this paper, a simple model of insider trading in an artiial market has
been presented. Quasi zero-intelligene random traders are ating on a losed
market providing a sort of thermal bath implying prie utuations. A fun-
damentalist insider gets the information of ash inow ourring on a future
6
day. He/she tries to exploit this piee of information by using a fundamental
strategy. It turns out that the insider is able to earn signiantly more money
than random traders. Due to the simple strategy implemented, the exess
gain of the insider dereases when his/her initial endowment of ash is larger.
The simulations presented above show that the Genoa Artiial Stok Market
(GASM) an be used to study instanes of fraudulent behaviour in nanial
markets. Future work ould fous on the eet of insiders in a market with
heterogeneous agents as well as dierent prie formation mehanisms (learing
house vs book, ...).
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Fig. 1. Results of a typial simulation.
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